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TOWARDS A MODEL OF GOVERNANCE IN COMPLEX (PRODUCT-
SERVICE) INTER-ORGANISATIONAL SYSTEMS 
 
Abstract 
Traditional business models coped with the complexity inherent in buying 
complex capital assets that will be operated and maintained over many years 
by a division of labour based on sub-sets of the value chain. Recently, 
customers in a wide range of sectors are not buying sub-contract production or 
construction capacity but procuring business Ǯsolutionsǯ. As a result, inter-
organisational interactions are changing in terms of their scale, scope and 
dynamic, requiring us to reconsider those mechanisms that co-ordinate inter-
organisational behaviour. Correspondingly, a conceptual model is developed 
that explores how contractual and relational mechanisms interact across 
different levels of analysis and over time. Reflecting on the implications of the 
model highlights how contractual and relational governance mechanisms are 
distinct but inseparable parts of a governance continuum, involving multi-level 
interactions and transitions. Given that these interactions/transitions influence 
the behaviour of exchange partners and impact the effectiveness of the overall 
governance mix these, albeit conceptual, insights should be beneficial to 
academics, practitioners and policy makers involved in complex product-
service systems. 
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Introduction 
The relationship between buyer and supplier has never been simple when what 
is being bought/delivered is a complex capital asset that will be operated and 
maintained over many years. Organisations traditionally coped with this 
complexity by a division of labour based on sub-sets of the value chain; that is 
some actors designed and/or built things while others maintained and 
supported them once operational. Increasingly however, more and more public 
and private sector buyers seek Ǯstrategicǯ contributions from their supply 
chains. The creation of Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) infrastructure projects in 
the public sector (Kumaraswamy and Zhang, 2001) for example – buyers 
optimistically seeking better value and performance – created the need for 
construction firms to develop their complex performance provision capabilities 
(Gann and Salter, 2000; Caldwell et al., 2009). Similarly in a range of other 
sectors, customers of firms like Flextronics (electronics sector) and Li and Fung 
(garment sector), are not buying sub-contract manufacturing capacity but 
procuring business Ǯsolutionsǯ. As a result, many suppliers that traditionally 
generated the majority of their income from the design and production of 
complex capital assets (e.g. construction firms) are facing significant challenges 
as they seek to capture service-based revenue; a phenomenon that has 
attracted increasing scholarly attention (e.g. Mathieu, 2001a; Mathieu, 2001b; 
Van der Valk, 2008; Wise and Baumgartner, 1999; Brady et al., 2005; Davies et 
al., 2007; Leiringer et al., 2009). Inevitably, these shifts mean that inter-
organisational interactions are also changing - in terms of their scale, scope and 
dynamic (Lindberg and Nordin, 2008). For example, the relationship between 
  
buyer and supplier of a complex product-service system is essentially 
interactive, that is characterised by open-ended design and manufacturing 
parameters and constant knowledge exchange leading (hopefully) to joint 
learning (Araujo et al., 1999) [1]. This type of interaction requires a 
reconceptualisation of both the traditional Ǯmake or buyǯ decision ȋ(olcomb 
and Hitt, 2007) and those mechanisms that co-ordinate subsequent inter-
organisational behaviour (Lewis and Roehrich, 2009). Given this backdrop, the 
paper develops a novel conceptual perspective on the governance of these 
complex, interactive, supply arrangements. Specifically it builds a model of 
how contractual and relational governance mechanisms (Poppo and Zenger, 
2002; Vandaele et al., 2007) interact over time, influencing the behaviour of 
exchange partners and ultimately impacting performance. 
 
The Conceptual ǮBuilding Blocksǯ 
This section sets out the initial structure (see Figure 1) for conceptualising inter-
organisational governance mechanisms - those contractual and relational rules 
of exchange between partners (North, 1990; Zenger et al., 2002) - and their 
interplay in a dyadic buyer-supplier relationship over time. 
 
Insert ǮFigure 1 Initial frameworkǯ about here 
 
Contractual Governance 
Contracts are those explicit (usually written, often detailed) and formal 
artefacts that specify the legally binding obligations and roles of both parties in 
  
a relationship (Lyons and Mehta, 1997). Contracts are intended to (a) reduce 
uncertainty by providing a clear specification of what is and what is not allowed 
within a relationship (Lui and Ngo, 2004), (b) minimise the risk of opportunism 
by enforcing legal rules, standards and other remedies implied in law (Achrol 
and Gundlach, 1999) and, (c) provide a safeguard against ex-post performance 
problems (Luo, 2002). There is a substantial literature that explores how 
contracts are used to ǲgovern the ways in which units can cooperate and/or 
competeǳ ȋDavis and North, 1971, pp.6-7) in turn highlighting that control 
through formal contracts depends on three underlining conditions (Bijlsma-
Frankema and Costa, 2005): 
 
1. Codification. Formal contracts are reliant on the programmability of 
tasks and behaviours and the measurability of outcomes ex ante. Thus, 
the transaction process and outcome between two parties need to be 
predictable and codifiable. 
2. Monitoring. Formal contracts require monitoring to determine actorsǯ 
behaviour with regards to the rules set out in the contract. 
3. Safeguards. For effective control, there needs to be institutional 
structure in place to enforce the contract. 
 
Given this context, the optimal contract is generally assumed to be the most 
Ǯcompleteǯ contract (i.e. one that covers the greatest number of contingencies) 
with the lowest design, monitoring and enforcement costs relative to a given 
outcome. 
  
The classical model of contractual governance involves a risk-averse agent who 
produces an output that is precisely observable by the risk-neutral principal and 
the agent, thus giving both parties symmetric information. The assumption of 
Ǯcomplete contractsǯ based on perfect ǲinformation with respect to the 
variables and functions determining the relationship, and with respect to 
identities and behaviourǳ of both parties ȋMacho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo, 
2001, p.37) is seldom representative of any Ǯrealǯ interaction. Empirical studies 
illustrate that both partnering organisations face imperfect and incomplete 
information about the other partyǯs preferences and characteristics ȋPlambeck 
and Zenios, 2000). Information asymmetry arising from behavioural 
uncertainty due to opportunism hinders the writing of complete, contingent 
contracts, thus leading to incomplete contracts. Table 1 summarises the 
problems that can arise as a result of asymmetric information in relationships. 
  
Insert ǮTable 1 Types of asymmetric informationǯ about here 
 
Moreover, organisations that aim to specify everything ex ante will inevitably 
face high transaction costs and this may delay project execution (Bijlsma-
Frankema and Costa, 2005). In other words, whatever the specific cause [2], in 
most exchanges one party has an unavoidable informational advantage over 
another that – in purely contractual terms - could potentially be exploited to 
the benefit of that party at the expense of the partner (Salanié, 1997). This 
reinforces the tendency to incur additional costs such as ex ante search costs 
  
(associated with adverse selection risk) and/or ex post monitoring and 
enforcement costs (associated with moral hazard and hold-up risks).  
 
Relational Governance 
Relational governance refers to those inter-organisational exchange 
mechanisms that are not sanctioned through formal contractual positions – 
although, as we have just discussed, they may be heavily influenced/framed by 
contracting - but are manifest in custom and practice (e.g. regular Ǯhow is it 
goingǯ callsȌ. They include social processes that promote norms of flexibility, 
solidarity, personal bonding and implicit understandings. These socially 
constructed, emergent, arrangements are not readily accessible through 
written documents and cannot be directly observed. 
Arguably the central component of relational governance is the notion of trust 
(Lui and Ngo, 2004). There are many definitions of trust but the concept (see 
Table 2) is typically presented with two core elements: positive expectations 
regarding the intentions or actions of others and voluntary vulnerability 
towards another actor (Rousseau et al., 1998). In other words, the notion 
encompasses an acceptance of the partnering organisationǯs ability to fulfil a 
task, in combination with a belief in the goodwill and positive intention of the 
organisation (Mayer et al., 1995). Building on definitions by Anderson and 
Weitz (1989) and Anderson and Narus (1990) we define trust as the expectation 
that an actor can be relied on to fulfil obligations, will behave in a predictable 
manner, and will act and negotiate fairly when the possibility for opportunism 
is present. 
  
It is also important to distinguish between inter-personal and inter-
organisational notions of trust.  
 
 Inter-personal trust is ǲthe extent of a boundary-spanning agentǯs trust 
in her counterpart in the partner organisationǳ ȋZaheer et al., ͙͡͡͠, 
p.142). It is established among individuals of the contracting 
organisations based upon close interaction and personal ties (Macaulay, 
1963; Kale et al., 2000). 
 Inter-organisational trust is ǲthe extent of trust placed in the partner 
organisation by the members of a focal organisationǳ ȋZaheer et al., 
1998, p.142). 
 
Insert ǮTable 2 Representative literature on trust conceptualisationǯ about 
here 
 
In a variety of studies conducted over the last 20 years, management scholars 
(n.b. many studying supply networks, like the auto industry, with structural 
inertia) have placed a great deal of emphasis on the need to develop long-term 
relationships that are characterised by higher levels of trust [3]. In general 
terms, the existence of trust is assumed to reduce the risk of opportunistic 
behaviour and pragmatic recognition of this has led many exchange parties to 
move towards more collaborative relationships (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). 
The effects of trust on performance have been identified as reduced 
transaction costs, greater openness and flexibility, closer collaboration and 
  
coordination, inter-organisational learning, improved conflict management 
and enhanced capacity for innovation (Sako, 1992; Ganesan, 1994; Powell, 
1996; Lane, 1998). In addition, studies have found that information sharing 
increases as perceptions of a partnerǯs trustworthiness increases ȋDyer and 
Chu, 2003). Another direct effect that reliance on trust has is an increase in 
learning and knowledge sharing between collaborating organisations (Dirks 
and Ferrin, 2001). Consequently, long-term relationships and trust are seen as 
encouraging effective communication, information sharing and joint pay-offs 
(Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Dwyer et al., 1987) and may create strong social 
bonds between the actors involved (Barney and Hansen, 1994). Moreover, 
parties who trust each other are more willing to engage in cooperative activity 
through which further trust may be generated (Putnam, 1993). 
 
Interactions between Contractual and Relational Governance 
Given that ǲvirtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element 
of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of timeǳ ȋArrow, 
1972, p.357) it is clear that, regardless of the specific advantages and 
disadvantages of contractual and relational governance (or indeed the 
constructs of classical and neoclassical contract theory) as stand-alone 
mechanisms, they are actually strongly complementary (if not indivisible) 
mechanisms. 
 
Contractual Governance and Relationships 
  
What comes first, the contract or the trust? Studies have shown that trusting 
relationships support open communication and this can have a significant 
impact on contract negotiations (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005; Zheng et al., 
2008). Equally, information sharing initiated by trusting relationships (Dyer and 
Singh, ͙͡͡͠Ȍ, ǲenables organisations to record aspects of their relationships in 
formal contractsǳ ȋVlaar et al., ͚͘͘͟, p.͙͜͜Ȍ. Even if, in practice, most 
companies involved in complex exchange understand that they are deploying 
incomplete contracts - containing non-legally enforceable and/or poorly 
specified intentions and conditions that may easily by misinterpreted by the 
courts (Deakin and Wilkinson, 1998) - that ǲgo beyond what is verifiableǳ 
(Chen, 2000, p.211), this can have advantages (Bernheim and Whinston, 1998). 
As an illustration, although ambiguity may increase the likelihood of conflict 
and hinder the ability to coordinate activities and resources (Goldberg, 1976), 
gaps in an incomplete contract that are filled as contingencies arise can offer 
contracting organisations more flexibility in the execution of the agreement 
(Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005). Indeed incomplete contracts could be seen as 
offering more protection in the presence of trust because these social processes 
can fill the gaps that exist in the contract (Arrow, 1974).  
Moreover, non-legally enforceable elements of a contract can still yield 
elements of formal control, by indicating limits of acceptability. Moreover, in a 
context where interactions take place over an extended timeframe (such as is 
common in a complex service-led asset acquisition process), the benefits of 
contractual governance are often presented as being quite Ǯinformalǯ: for 
example, as a means of cementing business relationships (Arrighetti et al., 
  
1997), or, as they represent promises or obligations to the future (Macneil, 
1978), they can thus promote the emergence of mutual trust (Parkhe, 1993). 
This is supported by Deakin et al.ǯs ȋ͙͟͡͡Ȍ study where contracts are used as 
planning and incentivisation tools in long-term business relationships. 
Contracting parties draw up contracts with the intention to safeguard the 
relationship against outside contingencies and not to safeguard against 
opportunism (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005). Other key features of contractual 
governance relate to its role in the termination of an exchange and conflict 
resolution. Relationship dissolution has been found to be particularly 
challenging when there is no written contract in place and when the 
relationship is of an exclusive, long-term nature, involving substantial 
investments by suppliers (Harrison, 2004). 
Reflecting this interaction, a number of authors argue that Ǯrelational contractsǯ 
can help to circumvent the difficulties involved in Ǯcompleteǯ complex (product-
service) contracting (Macneil, 1980, p.4; Baker et al., 2002). Specifically, rather 
than seeking to detail a contract ǲex ante in terms that can be verified ex post 
by the third party, a relational contract can be based on outcomes that are 
observed by only the contracting parties ex post, and also on outcomes that are 
prohibitively costly to specify ex anteǳ (Baker et al., 2002, p.40; Rahman and 
Kumaraswamy, 2002). 
 
Relational Governance and Contracts 
Advocates of the transaction cost economics [4] (TCE) perspective on inter-
organisational behaviour present a great deal of evidence to support the 
  
assertion that calculation, not trust, determines cooperative behaviour 
ȋWilliamson, ͙͡͡͞Ȍ. Kernǯs ȋ͙͡͡͠Ȍ study of low- and high-trust in the German 
Economy for example, suggested that overly trusting situations can lead to 
stagnation as a result of ǲlock-in situationsǳ between firms, and subsequently 
to risk-avoidance and the drying up of innovation. 
Moreover, Poppo et al. (2008) point out that trust not only binds, but also 
blinds parties. This view is supported by Uzzi (1997), arguing that long-
standing, relationally embedded relationships may suffer from sub-optimal 
information search. That is, organisations will become ǲlocked-intoǳ those 
relationships and thereby neglect to obtain other relevant information from the 
market. Such information may, for instance, prove vital for spotting shifting 
market trends or emerging innovative technology. 
Similarly, although trust resolves uncertainty about partners’ motives (Gulati et 
al., 2005), complex contracts clearly offer some protection from coordination 
failures and as a result, contracts might provide the foundation for future 
interaction and cooperation: Bachmannǯs (2001) study revealed that detailed 
and lengthy contracts are not necessarily interpreted as signalling distrust, but 
can function as a reaffirmation of expectations. 
In summary, like contractual governance, relational governance (with trust as 
its key component) is equally unreliable as a stand-alone safeguard and 
therefore some form of formal control is needed to reduce the hazards of 
opportunism in relationships. In the next section, we will use these building 
blocks to start constructing an integrative model of the governance process in 
interactive relationships. 
  
Discussion: Refining the Conceptual Model 
Using these building blocks, this section will refine a more comprehensive 
model of governance in complex (product-service) inter-organisational 
systems. Specifically it will explore the interactions between complex contracts 
and inter-organisational and inter-personal trust over time. 
 
Contracting for Complex (Product-Service) Arrangements 
Contracts occupy a crucial role at key stages in nearly all commercial 
interactions but for those organisations entering into product-service 
arrangements, necessarily encompassing complex future contingencies, there 
is a natural tendency for any contracting process to become more expensive, 
more complex and, paradoxically, more Ǯincompleteǯ. Although there has been 
– surprisingly perhaps - limited longitudinal research exploring the role of 
contracts (Halldórsson and Skjøtt-Larsen, 2006), it seems likely that, given that 
most of these are long-term arrangements, subsequent contract variations, 
arranged to reflect inevitable changes over time, will reinforce the complexity. 
Interestingly of course, although a product-service exchange may be heavily 
reliant on contractual mechanisms, this endogenous complexity and/or 
incompleteness may mean the arrangement lacks meaningful enforcement 
capabilities. Noting that the perceived risk of sunk costs (i.e. expenditure to 
build social capital between buyers/suppliers who do not ultimately commit to 
a commercial exchange) and various exogenous legal requirements (e.g. EU 
procurement regulations) is likely to strongly influence the precise level of 
investment in the development of relational governance, it is crucial to accent 
  
the significant benefits to all parties from greater emphasis on relational 
governance. 
 
Building Trust in Complex (Product-Service) Arrangements 
The process of constructing contractual Ǯartefactsǯ is the subject of extensive 
codification and formalisation whereas the development and maintenance of 
trust between exchange parties is a more ambiguous and collaborative 
endeavour - a cyclical process of recurrent bargaining, commitment, and 
execution events between partners (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). As discussed 
earlier, the notion of trust also has to be considered at two different levels of 
analysis - personal and organisational - and consideration of how these interact 
will help to further structure the governance model. 
 
Connecting Inter-personal and Inter-organisational Trust 
Consider the beginning of a Ǯtypicalǯ complex product-service exchange: 
informal meetings between key Ǯboundary-spanningǯ individuals (e.g. 
procurement manager and key account manager) prove extremely useful for 
building up trust. Over time these strong inter-personal ties, allowing for the 
effective exchange of ǲfine-grainedǳ information ȋUzzi, 1997) that can help to 
create common norms and compatible cultures (Doz and Hamel, 1998), provide 
effective channels through which partners learn and share knowledge (Gulati 
and Gargiulo, 1999; Lawson et al., 2009). Moreover, Ǯopennessǯ can help 
address sensitive ex-ante relationship issues such as relationship termination 
and contractual penalties. Contracts can prescribe the formation of formal 
  
integrative mechanisms, such as meetings and teams, which have the potential 
to create/enhance social exchange (Lawson et al., 2009) they cannot enforce 
informal exchange and cannot mandate the eventual success of any such 
initiatives. Over time, establishing organisational frameworks, possibly 
supported by contracts, which Ǯtranslateǯ these routines of information sharing 
and knowledge exchange from an inter-personal level to an inter-
organisational level is vital for the relationship. These more formal inter-
organisational arrangements can then facilitate further formation of inter-
personal trust. This is particularly significant if there will be changes in key 
personnel as the project moves from bid/negotiation to build/operate phases. 
 
The Model 
In combining these elements into a single model it is important to reflect on the 
nature of their interactions and in particular whether specific governance 
ingredients need to be deployed in a particular sequence? Three Ǯstagesǯ are 
identifiable from the preceding arguments: 
 
1. Encouraging individuals to engage in frequent boundary-spanning 
activities is arguably the critical initial stage (e.g. pre-contract and bid 
phases) (Malhotra and Murnighan, 2002). In the absence of inter-
personal trust, all subsequent processes will be more challenging. 
2. Effective contracts build on established inter-personal trust. Moreover, 
contracts should include explicitly Ǯrelationalǯ mechanisms for building 
inter-organisational trust: such as cross-organisation teams, regular 
  
meetings, off-site Ǯaway-daysǯ, etc. These should be deployed before 
key initial boundary spanners leave any project; as they will provide the 
basis for the next generation of inter-personal relationships. 
3. Given the inevitability of subsequent contractual revisions, these should 
be treated as a stock take of the relationship and content relating to 
knowledge-transfer and learning mechanisms should be revised as 
logically as commercial terms. 
 
Insert ǮFigure 2 Governance of complex (product-service) inter-
organisational systemǯ about here 
 
To reiterate, the conceptual model presents inter-organisational governance as 
a continuum of contractual and relational (itself a continuum from individual to 
organisational) mechanisms - different but mutually inter-dependent. It also 
draws out the dynamic interplay of these mechanisms over time - the three 
governance stages detailed above are labelled 1, 2 and 3 on the figure.  
 
Conclusions and Implications 
By deploying a range of extant theoretical resources in constructing a model of 
governance in these complex inter-organisational systems, this conceptual 
paper set out to generate new insights for the emerging debate around 
Ǯservice-ledǯ procurement arrangements. Key conclusions can be highlighted in 
three areas. First, having considered the advantages and disadvantages of 
contractual and relational governance as stand-alone mechanisms, it was clear 
  
that they are actually distinct but inseparable parts of a governance continuum. 
For instance, contract negotiations should focus on clarifying assumptions and 
expectations towards the long-term relationship, rather than Ǯmerelyǯ focusing 
on the establishment of contractual safeguards. Second, enacting this notion 
of a governance continuum necessarily involves multi-level interactions and 
transitions. For example, inter-personal trust, as exercised by individual 
boundary-spanners, needs to be connected to the inter-organisational 
contracting process. These interactions are also driven by the differential 
dynamics of the two core components. Once a complex contract has been 
established at the outset of the relationship, its importance will only reduce 
marginally. However, relational governance (especially if based primarily on 
boundary-spanning relationships) can easily diminish if key individuals leave 
the project. Rebuilding these relationships is a slow sequential and incremental 
process. Finally, the deployed sequence for particular components has an 
impact on the effectiveness of the overall governance. For example, initiating 
any complex interaction without an early emphasis (i.e. investment) in building 
inter-personal trust is likely to create barriers to developing an appropriate 
contract.  
 
Potential Lessons for Practice 
Although always intended to be a conceptual paper, the following implications 
have practical resonance. First, capabilities for contractual governance should 
be seen as a crucial, but not sufficient Ǯqualifierǯ for effective product-service 
exchange. Effective inter-organisational governance requires a complementary 
  
– not substitute - emphasis on pro-active relational governance. Second, 
investment in boundary-spanning individuals is likely to have a positive effect 
on interactive exchange relationships. These Ǯinformation richǯ exchanges will 
inevitably be enhanced in both the short (i.e. during contract negotiations) and 
long-term by increased levels of relevant and trustworthy information flow. 
Third, ensuring the sustainability of any positive performance generated from 
developing inter-personal trust depends not only on establishing boundary-
spanning relationships among individuals, but also on translating those 
relationships into formal inter-organisational frameworks. Inter-organisational 
frameworks overcome the fragility of individual relationships by manifesting, 
for instance, information exchange procedures. Thus, a central focus for 
exchange governance should be the maintenance and translation of inter-
personal relationships into inter-organisational frameworks. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
Any conceptual study has limitations, but it is important to stress that this 
model should not be seen as an end in itself but rather the point of departure 
for further theorizing and, crucially, empirical research (Melnyk and Handfield, 
1998). A range of different research questions and methods could be 
considered: for example, longitudinal empirical research considering DBO-type 
arrangements will help to investigate the interaction and roles of contractual 
and relational governance mechanisms over extended time periods. Rich 
empirical investigation would also help to describe the different paths of both 
governance mechanisms, their interplay over time and understand their impact 
  
on overall performance. Equally, the product-service phenomenon has 
emerged in a wide range of areas and a cross-sectoral analysis (possibly using a 
large scale survey instrument) could illuminate important trends and lessons to 
be learnt. 
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Endnotes 
[1] The authors classified four different types of relationships between buyers and suppliers: 
Standardised; Specified; Translation, and Interactive. This work builds directly on the Industrial 
Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) groupǯs approach to interactions between customer and 
supplier (e.g. Håkansson, 1982, Håkansson and Ford, 2002). 
[2] In addition to these structural factors, the bounded rationality of the human actorsǯ involved 
(e.g. TCE and Agency Theory) also contributes to incomplete contracts (Hart, 1988). 
[3] Giunipero et al.ǯs ȋ͚͘͘͠Ȍ comprehensive literature review highlights that the number of 
research studies on trust in buyer-supplier relationships increased dramatically over the last 
decade. 
[4] Assuming opportunism and bounded rationality (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997), Transaction 
cost economics ȋTCEȌ asserts that firms attempt to minimise transaction costs by ǲassigning 
transactions (which differ in their attributes) to governance structures (the adaptive capacities 
and associated costs of which differȌ in a discriminating wayǳ ȋWilliamson, ͙͡͠͝, p.͙͠Ȍ. As a 
result, firms only internalise activities where adverse costs might arise from operational 
difficulties in a market exchange, primarily uncertainty, frequency, and asset-specificity. 
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control the activities 
undertaken by the agent 
(even if the principal can 
fully monitor the actions, 
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judge them properly). 
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maximise the agentǯs profit 
Observes that an agent 
maximises his own profit 
instead of realising the 
principalǯs objectives 
Principal might still find it 
optimal to further 
employ the agent 
because of irreversible 
investments ȋǲsunk 
costsǳȌ 
 
Table 1 Types of asymmetric information 
  
 
Source Conceptualisation of Trust                                                            
(inter-personal and inter-organisational) 
Deutsch 
(1958) 
An individual may be said to have trust in the occurrence of an event if he 
expects its occurrence and his expectation leads to behaviour which he 
perceives to have greater negative motivational consequences, if the 
expectation is not confirmed than positive motivational consequences, if it is 
confirmed. 
Zand (1972)  Actions that increase oneǯs vulnerability to another whose behaviour is not 
under oneǯs control in a situation in which the penalty one suffers, if the other 
abuses that vulnerability, is greater than the benefit one gains if the other 
does not abuse that vulnerability. 
Granovetter 
(1985) 
Confidence in the general morality of individuals. 
Bradach and 
Eccles (1989) 
The positive expectation that reduces the risk that the exchange partner will 
act opportunistically. 
Anderson and 
Narus (1990) 
A firmǯs belief that partners will perform actions that will result in positive 
outcomes for the firm and will not take unexpected actions that would result 
in negative outcomes for the firm. 
Sitkin and 
Roth (1993) 
The belief, attitude or expectation that the actions or outcomes of another 
individual or organisation will be acceptable or will serve the partnerǯs 
interest. 
Morgan and 
Hunt (1994) 
Confidence in the partnerǯs reliability and integrity. 
Gulati (1995) The particular level of subjective probability with which agents assess 
whether another agent or group will perform a particular action both before 
they can monitor such action and in a context in which it affects their own 
action. 
Kumar et al. 
(1995) 
The belief that the partner is honest and benevolent.  
Uzzi (1997) The belief that an exchange partner would not act in self-interest at anotherǯs 
expense and operates not with calculated risk but uses a heuristic approach, 
having a predilection to assume the best when interpreting anotherǯs  
motives and actions.  
Sako and 
Helper (1998) 
Expectation held by an agent that its trading partner will behave in a mutually 
expectable manner (including an expectation that neither party will exploit 
the otherǯs vulnerabilitiesȌ. 
Rousseau et 
al. (1998) 
A psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based 
on positive expectations of the intentions or the behaviour of another. 
Zaheer et al. 
(1998) 
The leap of faith by placing confidence in a referent without knowing with 
absolute certainty that the referentǯs future actions will not produce 
unpleasant surprises. 
Currall and 
Inkpen (2002) 
Trust is the decision to rely on a partner with the expectation that the partner 
will act according to a common agreement. 
Johnston et al. 
(2004) 
Supplierǯs perception of buyerǯs dependability and supplierǯs perception of 
buyerǯs benevolence. 
De Wever et 
al. (2005) 
The willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party, 
based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action 
important to the truster, irrespective of their being the ability to monitor or 
control that other party. 
 
Table 2 Representative literature on trust conceptualisation  
(adapted from Geyskens et al., 1998, p.226) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Initial inter-organisational conceptual framework 
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Figure 2 Governance of complex (product-service) inter-organisational system 
